Starting in the late 1990s and accelerating between 2003 to 2007, regulatory shifts (McCoy et al. 2009 ) and changes to the structure of the mortgage chain led to the onset of a secondary mortgage lending regime dominated by private-label securitization and mediated by Wall Street investment banks Wachter, 2014) . A substantial expansion of credit followed. The number of purchase mortgages originated increased from 4.3 million to 5.7 million and remained above 5.5 million through 2006 (FFIEC 2015) . Private-label securities (PLS) had originally funded jumbo mortgages whose size precluded their inclusion in GSE securitizations. The PLS lending of 2003 through 2007 funded non-traditional mortgage (NTM) products and subprime loans. Prior to the PLS boom, most mortgages were, conforming, self-amortizing 30-year fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs). However, during the boom, there was a substantial increase in non-traditional mortgages, including non-amortizing (or negative amortization) balloon, interest-only (IO), and option-payment mortgage products, as well as subprime loans and other Alt-A products (which did not require full documentation of income). 
A. Principal-Agent Problems in Securitization
Securitization ushered in new principal-agent problems that the inventors of MBS worked to address. Adverse selection was one issue, consisting of the fear that originators would retain their best loans and securitize the rest. Investors were also concerned about information asymmetries, because lenders know more about the quality of the loans they originate than investors and have incentives to conceal negative information when selling those loans. 6 Private capital would shun the mortgage finance system absent assurances to investors on both scores. Consequently, securitizers used a host of techniques to address the principal-agent problems in securitization, including disclosures, underwriting standards, quality control, due diligence reviews, and risk retention. Key among those techniques was representations and warranties, the focus of this chapter.
B. The Use of Representations and Warranties in MBS
Every mortgage-backed securitization starts out with the sale of a pool of mortgage loans by a seller to a purchaser. The purchaser is generally a GSE, an FHA/VA securitization issuer, or an investment bank that plans to transfer the loans to a special purpose vehicle for bundling into MBS for sale to investors. Often the seller is the originator, but it can also be a large bank that aggregates loans bought from a third-party originator. In the course of the series of transfers that make up a securitization, many of the transferors make representations and warranties to the next transferee down the chain (Murphy 2012 ).
The central contract governing the loan sale is a Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement
between the seller and the purchaser (Miller 2014, 259, 267) . This agreement or its equivalents are found in all three major securitization channels, including Ginnie Mae, the GSEs and privatelabel securitizations (FHFA 2012, 6, 10-12) . The typical Agreement contains over fifty Loan Purchase Agreement 2005, § 6). The Agreements go on to state that following prompt written notice of the discovery of such an inaccuracy, the seller shall use its best efforts to promptly cure the breach within ninety days. If the breach cannot be cured, then the seller, at the purchaser's option, shall repurchase the mortgage loan at issue at the purchase price 8 (see, e.g., id., § 6). Effectively, this gives the purchaser a put option for loans that violate representations and warranties.
In theory, this put option is quite strong. This remedy is not technically conditioned on a realized loss to the investor; instead, it can apply so long as a breach results in a material paper loss to the mortgage loan in question. As a practical matter, however, operationally relatively "small" errors in representations would not in general lead to exercise of the put option prior to default. In default such errors become salient. And in the crisis the decline in real estate prices made such ordinarily ignored errors particularly salient as prices and collateral declined dramatically.
At the same time, the contractual remedy for breach of representations and warranties is only as good as a seller's solvency. For the put option to have bite, a seller must still be operating and have sufficient assets to pay a judgment. This became a particular concern in the case of breaches by nonbank lenders, over one hundred of whom operated with razor-thin margins and capsized after they lost their funding in 2007. To investors' chagrin, those representations and warranties failed to prevent the spike in mortgage loan defaults that culminated in the 2008 financial crisis. As discussed above, by the early 2000s, private-label securitization had outgrown its traditional function of funding jumbo conforming loans to also financing increasing numbers of nontraditional mortgage products. During the run-up to the crisis, the proliferation of subprime and Alt-A loans was accompanied by a marked deterioration in loan underwriting standards. Between 2002 and 2006, two of the strongest predictors of default rose noticeably: loan-to-value ratios and the proportion of loans with combined loan-to-value ratios of over eighty percent (Levitin and Wachter 2015) .
Meanwhile, lenders increasingly layered one risk on top of another, often combining low-equity, no-amortization loans with reduced documentation underwriting (McCoy et al. 2009, 504-05 & fig. 3 ). Loan fraud also became more prevalent during this period, with private-label securitized mortgages and low-documentation mortgages experiencing particularly high levels of fraud (Mian and Sufi 2015) . Loan origination volume shifted to lenders who used private-label securitization with lower and less well enforced underwriting standards, although there is evidence that there was somewhat of a decline in the GSE underwriting standards as well (Wachter 2014; Wachter 2016) . Under pressure to maintain market share, other lenders cast aside their reputational concerns and lowered their lending standards in response (Engel and McCoy 2011, 38-40) .
As the ensuing disaster unfolded, it soon became apparent that representations and warranties had not prevented the sharp deterioration in underwriting standards during the credit bubble. Increasingly, it became apparent that loan features and performance that were in direct breach of the representations and warranties -including excessive loan-to-value ratios, early payment defaults, and outright fraud -had become commonplace. The first warning signs of higher defaults appeared in subprime and Alt-A adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) beginning in mid-2005 and worsened after that (see Figure 3 ). As defaults mounted in 2006, the number of mortgage repurchase requests remained modest but started to increase in response 10 (Sabry and Schopflocher 2007) . According to Fitch Ratings, early payment defaults were the "root cause" of these early repurchase requests, particularly in loans with layered risks such as lower credit scores, second-liens and stated income underwriting (Fitch 2006 
E. Repurchase Demands and Actions to Enforce Put-back Clauses
As falling home prices impeded the ability of distressed borrowers to avoid default by refinancing their loans or selling their homes, mortgage delinquencies skyrocketed (see Figure 3) and mortgage put-back requests surged (Hartman-Glaser et al. 2014, 28 fig. 3 ). Data on aggregate recoveries for all put-back demands are hard to come by. But we can get a sense of the magnitude by examining put-back collections by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. and Freddie collected a total of $76.1 billion from over 3,000 companies for loans repurchased from their mortgage-backed securitization trusts (GSE Repurchase Activity). This more than doubled the total industry liability that Standard & Poor's had originally estimated for GSE repurchase and securitization claims in 2011 (Murphy 2012) . Not all of the GSEs' put-back claims were successful, however, and the two enterprises ultimately withdrew or stopped pursuing another $61.9 billion in repurchase demands (GSE Repurchase Activity). For the putback claims that settled, the average payment per loan was substantially less than the average purchase price for all of the loans 11 (Siegel and Stein 2015) .
In addition, Fannie and Freddie pursued claims for their purchases of private-label MBS during the housing bubble (Hill 2011 (Hill /2012 . In January 2016, their regulator and conservator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), reported that it had settled lawsuits against sixteen out of eighteen financial institutions involving the sale of private-label instruments to Fannie and Freddie. Technically, these were not buyback claims insofar as the actions alleged securities law violations and sometimes fraud in the sale of the PLS. But these claims were also founded on lax mortgages and their financial effect on originators and issuers was similar. Total settlement amounts equaled $18.2 billion as of year-end 2014 (FHFA 2016b).
Sources of Put-back Claims
As this discussion of GSE recoveries suggests, each of the three securitization channels has generated put-back demands and lawsuits (Standard & Poor's 2013a) . While these demands share many similarities across channels, there are also differences depending on the channel.
Turning to the private-label channel, many private-label issuances featured long chains of transfers involving mortgage brokers, loan originators, correspondent or wholesale lenders, investment banks, depositors, trustees, and investors. At each link in the securitization chain, representations and warranties were often made. Consequently, put-back demands for any given securitization in the PLS channel usually involved not just one but a sequence of repurchase requests throughout the chain 12 (Hill 2011 (Hill /2012 Murphy 2012) . Private-label securities were especially prone to buyback claims because they experienced higher average default rates than GSE RMBS (Fitch 2011) .
As discussed, the GSE channel also generated repurchase claims. Although the GSEs' issuances performed better on average than their PLS cousins, as noted above, the representations and warranties made to Fannie and Freddie were stronger in nature and spawned more interpretive case law due to their standardization, making them easier to litigate successfully (Fleming 2013; Strubel 2011) . 
Success of Put-back Claims
As the GSE experience shows, buyback claims have not been invariably successful. The chances of prevailing on claims for breach of representations and warranties vary widely according to the type of breach, the passage of time, the litigation capacity of the plaintiff, and the solvency of the defendant.
To begin with, success may turn on the type of claim. Some breaches of representations and warranties are easily proven because they turn on commonly available evidence using objective standards. Early payment defaults are a good example, because servicing records normally show whether the borrower was delinquent in the first three months of the loan.
Other breaches are harder to substantiate and subject to dispute. The facts may require further investigation into hard-to-obtain documents outside of the purchaser's possession or the representation in question may be couched in vague or subjective language. Thus, cases alleging false loan-to-value ratios or appraised values require reconstructing the actual appraised value at origination, which is subject to debate and difficult to do. Purchasers who assert other types of fraud or misrepresentation generally must prove those claims based on evidence from the face of the loan or deal documents, which can be daunting (Miller 2014, 300-301) . Buyback disputes over loans that supposedly were allowed to depart from underwriting standards due to compensating factors can be particularly messy to litigate.
While it is relatively simple to point to errors in loan documents based on a sample of the contested book of business, the import of those errors will be in question. Were they simple errors (such as whether the borrower was self-employed versus a contractual employee) that would not or should not be counted against the originator? Or are a large share of such errors indicative of sloppy underwriting that should and does matter to outcomes in conjunction with a price decline, even though it is the price decline itself which is a major factor in default and thus in losses?
In addition, the amount of time that has elapsed since the loan sale affects the deterrent role of reps and warranties and the prospects for compensation. Many Mortgage Loan Purchase
Agreements predating the crisis contained no hard-and-fast outer time limits on bringing putback claims. Under those contractual provisions, and absent an otherwise binding statute of limitations, a purchaser could ostensibly demand repurchase any time upon discovery of a breach of a representation until the loan principal was fully repaid (Hartman-Glaser et al. 2014; Miller 2014, 311; Tate) . This is not a hypothetical concern: Hartman-Glaser et al. (2014) discovered loans from GSE securitizations going back to 1985 that were the subject of repurchase requests between 2011 and 2014 (id., 2 n.2). In too many cases, defects did not surface and repurchase claims were not made until those responsible were long gone, eviscerating the deterrent function of representations and warranties.
This timing issue is a double-edged sword for purchasers and sellers. The more time that elapses until a put-back demand is made, the harder it is for the purchaser to prove due to dimming memories, missing witnesses, and lost documentation (Miller 2014, 299-300) . At the same time, the specter of open-ended contingent liabilities can erode investors' confidence in a bank or other issuer. For this reason, sellers have aggressively resisted older put-back claims based on lack of reasonably prompt notice 16 or expiration of statutes of limitations (id.).
The litigation capacity of the purchaser also affects the likelihood of successful put-back claims. The vigor with which the GSEs pursued buyback demands reflected their ability to terminate lenders' contractual rights to sell agency loans (Hill 2011 (Hill /2012 , 17 their greater litigation might combined with that of the federal government, plus the mission of Fannie and
Freddie's conservator to maximize the assets in the conservatorship estates in many cases.
Similarly, Ginnie Mae's ability to pursue claims through civil actions brought by the Justice Department -together with the threat of treble damages under the False Claims Act --substantially enhanced its power to negotiate favorable settlements.
In contrast, investors found it harder to bring successful put-back claims for private-label securities. One hurdle consists of the fact that representations and warranties for PLS are less standardized than those for agency MBS (Fleming 2013; Standard & Poor's 2013a, 6 ). In addition, in order to have standing, at least twenty-five percent of an issue's shares must first generally vote to demand that the securitization trustee pursue a put-back claim. Only if the trustee fails to take action within a set period of time may investors directly sue. Still, investor groups have managed to surmount this obstacle (Murphy 2012; Standard & Poor's 2013a, 6 ). 
III. Market Responses and Policy Implications
There have been two major market responses to the post-crisis impact of put-backs.
Citing the need to avoid future put-backs (Lux and Greene 2015, 17, 24) , major lendersparticularly well-capitalized lenders who have much to lose in the event of future put-back claims --have either withdrawn from government-insured lending or have imposed on themselves credit overlays that go beyond the requirements of the GSEs, thereby lowering their market share. 18 Nonbank lenders have emerged as the major origination channel to fill this gap.
The shift is dramatic.
The problems with these market responses are two-fold. First, the shift to thinly capitalized entities implies that, in a future crisis, representation and warranty penalties could not be effectively enforced against those entities. This undermines the compensatory value of reps and warranties going forward.
Second, lenders who believe they are no longer assured of default insurance through FHA and the GSEs are imposing credit overlays that go beyond the levels required by FHA and the GSEs. These lending constraints go beyond historic levels and beyond the levels historically associated with creditworthy lending, with mortgage market and home lending consequences that are described below.
A. The Shift to Thinly Capitalized Entities, Growth of Credit Overlays and Consequences
Immediately after the crisis, most home mortgages were originated by the major banks that were subject to capital adequacy and repurchase reserve requirements. More recently, however, the market share of mortgage originations by banks and especially the largest banks has fallen substantially (see Figure 4 ). This void has been filled by more thinly capitalized nonbank mortgage originators who are not regulated by prudential banking regulators for solvency (Lux and Greene 2015) , renewing concerns about the financial capacity of those lenders to make good on their representations and warranties. At the same time, imposition of credit overlays by bank lenders who believe they are no longer assured of default insurance through FHA and the GSEs has resulted in a mortgage market that is notably constrained. This market constraint may be explained in part from regulatory pressures from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and
Department of Justice (DOJ). Although the primary intent of HUD and DOJ enforcement is
compliance with HUD rules, it has prompted FHA's largest bank lenders to announce that they significantly reducing their extension of mortgage credit in response (Goodman 2015) . As
Goodman (2015) states, "lenders have begun to protect themselves the only way available to them: credit overlays, risk-based pricing, or a general pull away from FHA lending."
As evidence of the role of buyback requests on mortgage underwriting standards, Hartman-Glaser et al. (2014) show that the change in the probability of buyback requests on GSE MBS explains tighter mortgage lending standards. Figure 5 , taken from Hartman-Glaser et al.,
demonstrates the tightening of standards for FICO scores.
The housing market has certainly made a recovery since the financial crisis, with housing starts having doubled since the recession. However, these heightened constraints on mortgage credit continue to suppress demand for housing and homeownership 20 (Zandi and Parrott 2014) .
In an analysis of the extent to which constrained credit has affected the mortgage market, Bai et al. (2016) Accordingly, the goal of reforms to representations and warranties should be to reverse the procyclicality that is inherent in the current system. To achieve this, it will be necessary to right-size the enforcement of these provisions while endowing them with deterrent effect. Doing so will enhance financial stability while expanding the credit box in a healthy and sustainable way going forward.
B. Procedural Reforms
One way to increase the efficacy of representations and warranties is to counter the long disconnect between breaches of those representations and enforcement. In many cases, the perpetrators of those breaches were long gone by the time repurchase claims were made.
Shortening the timespan between the sale of loans and the presentation of put-back claims will enhance deterrence while speeding up recovery.
After the financial crisis, the put-back process was slow to initiate in many cases and arduously protracted afterwards, thus prolonging the threat of litigation. In part, this could be blamed on resistance to put-back claims by sellers. However, purchasers contributed to the drawn-out nature of the proceedings by dragging their feet in presenting claims. The GSEs, for instance, did not close out their repurchase claims on loans originated before 2009 until the end of 2013, and only then at the insistence of FHFA's then Acting Director, Edward DeMarco (Goodman et al. 2015, 7) .
The GSEs, FHFA, and other actors eventually instituted a variety of reforms to speed up the put-back process. The GSEs instituted sunset provisions to bring some finality to the putback process for performing loans. 21 In addition, some court decisions hold that statutes of limitation on buyback claims run from the date of sale, not the date of discovery (Miller 2014, 290, 312) , putting the onus on purchasers to make claims more promptly.
Another concern is the vague and open-ended nature of some of the representations and warranties on which sellers are sued. In private-label deals, sellers had latitude to renegotiate the language of the representations and warranties they agreed to, thus potentially undermining their capacity to deter. Their negotiating ability was substantially less in deals with the GSEs and Ginnie Mae.
There will always be tension about the advisability of objective representations versus ones that are more general and ambiguous. Sellers want certainty about compliance and the extent of their exposure; purchasers worry about losses from negligence, fraud and misconduct that they cannot anticipate in advance. A problem, as discussed further below, is that a breach may be "minor." In the nature of underwriting it may be difficult to avoid such mistakes completely. Then in the aftermath of a crisis, all such mistakes may be grist for put-back claims.
But how to tell which claims are important and which are not? While this tension will likely
It would be also advisable to standardize representations and warranties as much as possible in the private-label market. Doing so would promote the growth of arbitral decisions and case law interpreting those standardized terms, which could then provide guidance for faster resolution of similar disputes in the future.
Similarly, it is time to confront the fact that False Claims Act treble damages sanctions are overkill in the absence of knowing fraud. The threat of treble damages is discouraging bank lenders from serving the low-and moderate-income community that FHA loans were designed to serve. Instead, penalties for flaws in FHA loans should be tailored to the FHA's defect taxonomy, according to the seriousness of the violation and the violator's culpability (Goodman 2015; HUD 2014) .
In an ideal world, the deterrent effect of representations and warranties could also be strengthened on the front end to curb the proliferation of lax loans during credit booms while obviating the need for enforcement. Suggested reforms have included improved due diligence and internal quality control, stronger data integrity controls for automated underwriting systems, faster post-purchase reviews by investors, and improved, standardized disclosures for put-back obligations (which the Securities and Exchange Commission issued in 2014 (Dodd Frank Act § 943; SEC 2014).
All of these reforms, in place or contemplated, have a potential flaw, however, which is that they rely on originators' compliance. Standardized disclosures and detailed underwriting guidelines are only as good as the integrity of the underwriting process that generates them. Even if some purchasers carefully monitor loan originations through pre-purchase and post-purchase quality assurance and control as suggested, there is the potential for other purchasers to not do so, thus undermining the quality of underwriting for the system as a whole. Those originators and purchasers who skirt requirements and procedures in the "hustle" for business will rapidly gain market share at the same time they lower their costs. The result will be higher prices as loans are made that otherwise would not be made and the higher prices will mask the poor underwriting. The representations and warranties may stop some but if more aggressive lenders operate in this way, there is an "externality" (Wachter 2014 ) that results as the quality of the aggregate mortgage book of business deteriorates and risk increases even for more careful lenders. Moreover those lenders who are willing to undermine standards will set the bar lower for other lenders who unless they similarly lower the bar will not be able to attract the marginal borrower (Pavlov and Wachter 2006) . And the process is unleashed again.
C. Systemic Reforms
Lenders have called for greater clarity in the representations and warranties that they provide. But better drafting alone is not the answer to deterrence. The events of 2008 showed that lenders ignored even objective representations and warranties such as loan-to-value caps in the rush for greater market share at the height of the credit bubble. The market incentives are for contractual representations and warranties to be procyclically implemented. Besides market forces that lead to sliding standards across firms, in the aftermath, there will be competitive tightening: firms will not want to be the lax lender when they fear that representations and warranties will be strictly enforced. While a normal level of "mistakes" is to be expected and not entirely avoidable, such mistakes will become the potential source for put-backs if in the overall market, prices have plummeted due to the aftermath of the unsustainable expansion of credit.
And at that point put-backs bite. Accordingly, stronger external measures are needed in order for representations and warranties to have real teeth, to prevent market-wide pressures for deterioration in underwriting. Some of those measures are already in place.
Ability-to-repay and qualified mortgage provisions:
The new ability-to-repay and A shift to the countercyclical technique known as dynamic provisioning would reverse this perverse sequence of events. During credit booms, dynamic provisioning triggers a switch in the algorithm for loss reserves that calculates those reserves as if credit was contracting.
Later, if an economic downturn strikes, that switch is turned off (Caprio 2009, 22; Ren 2011, 11-19) . This model requires lenders to build up their representations and warranties reserves during credit booms, when they have cash, and allows them to spend down those reserves during economic downturns to pay for any legal exposures. To the extent that these added reserves made representations and warranties more effective, any resulting legal liability would be reduced. Nevertheless, the new provision will require lenders to incorporate forecasts of future conditions in addition to past and current events and record projected losses up front. Importantly, the new FASB provision applies to all bank and nonbank lenders alike. In the capital arena, however, regulatory arbitrage remains a serious concern. Federal banking regulators lack jurisdiction to impose minimum capital requirements on independent nonbank lenders (Board of Governors et al. 2016b, 37) . 26 Even if they did have jurisdiction, uniform capital standards would be highly unlikely, given federal regulators' conclusion that Basel III is incompatible with the business models of some large nonbank mortgage servicers (id., 37-39). This means that as the nonbank sector grows, it will continue to enjoy arbitrage opportunities and escape the disciplining effect of uniform capital requirements. Not only will this reduce the in terrorem effect of representations and warranties, it will perpetuate competitive inequalities among bank and nonbank lenders. Unless Congress empowers federal banking regulators to impose capital adequacy requirements on mortgage lenders regardless of charter, it will be incumbent on the GSEs, Ginnie Mae, and the private-label sector to demand more meaningful safeguards from nonbank originators than they have so far. 27 Whether these investors will impose sufficient capital requirements during a credit boom, when nonbank originators are likely to expand and investors are prone to over-optimism, is questionable.
Moreover if investors and private label securitizers themselves, in a bid to grow market share, fail to demand comparable safeguards from nonbank originators, the game will be on again. We can already see potential warning signs of trouble in the rising numbers of FHA mortgages being made by nonbank lenders to borrowers with FICO scores below 660. (Lux and Greene 2015, 18-25) .
IV. Conclusion
During the run-up to the 2008 financial crisis, representations and warranties (contractual statements enforceable through legal action) on lending processes may have given investors false assurance that mortgage loans were being properly underwritten. This assurance in turn may have contributed to overinvestment in MBS in two ways. First, the assumption that legally enforceable penalties associated with reps and warranties would deter lax underwriting may have led to less screening of loans than would otherwise have occurred. In turn, the failure to oversee actual underwriting practices enabled the spread of lax lending practices. The existence of these reps and warranties and the potential penalties associated with them did not deter lax underwriting. Paradoxically, after the fact when the reps and warranties were enforced, this enforcement coincided with a tightening of credit beyond historic norms, with serious distributive implications. Post-crisis, lenders' fears over put-back exposure appear to have caused them to scale back, particularly on government lending to creditworthy borrowers. The reps and warranties as used in mortgage lending in the run-up to the crisis were part of the procyclicality of lending, both in the easing and tightening phases of the lending cycle.
We suggest reforms to add to the deterrent value of reps and warranties. Particularly we suggest a shift to the countercyclical technique known as dynamic provisioning to increase the in terrorem effect of representations and warranties. This model requires lenders to build up their representations and warranties reserves during credit booms, when they have cash and when risk is growing, and allows them to spend down those reserves during economic downturns to pay for any legal exposures. To the extent that these added reserves signaled greater risk they would make self-enforcement of representations and warranties more effective and procyclicality would be reduced. We also propose stricter capital standards.
Nonetheless such changes would be useless unless they were adopted throughout the lending industry: otherwise, just those entities with risky practices would increase their market share. And next time such entities are more likely to be thinly capitalized, as the lesson of capital exposure to legal risk has been learned, thus further reducing the deterrence effect of reps and warranties, going forward.
